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Abstract: A symmetric key encryption scheme is described for blocks of
general size N that is a product of powers of many prime numbers. This is
accomplished by realising each number (representing a message unit) as a
point in a product of affine spaces over various finite fields. Then algebro-
geometric transformations on those spaces is transported back to provide
encryption. For a specific block size < 2128 we get more than 25478 keys.
Keywords: block ciphers; symmetric key encryptions; FPE; affine spaces;
Jonquie`res automorphisms
Introduction
A typical block cipher takes the set M = {0, 1, 2, . . . , N − 1}, the set of
message units, and provides one permutation of that set corresponding to
each element (a secret key) of another set called the keyspace. The larger
the keyspace, the more difficult it is to break the cryptosystem by exhaustive
search for keys.
For ease of implementation in electronic hardware, usually the cardinal-
ity N is taken as a power of 2. When N = 2n, these are called n-bit block
ciphers.
The well-known industry standard cipher, AES encryption, provides
three variants that are 128-bit, 192-bit and 256-bit block ciphers. (That
is, they permute sets of huge sizes such as 2128).
There are situations where one needs permutations of sets of size different
from powers of 2, and that branch of cryptology is called format-preserving
encryption (FPE). (See Black and Rogaway [BR02], Brightwell and Smith
[BS97] and [FIPS74]). FPE, for example, tries to encrypt a 16-digit credit
card number into something that again looks like a credit card number.
In this paper we describe a construction of block cipher for sets of size
N with N factorizable into many prime powers.
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The novelty in our scheme is the choice of geometric model for the set of
message units. It is a product of affine spaces. Being an uncomplicated affine
variety the task of mounting points of the message space onto this geometric
object is a simple one. The transformations on our geometric model arise
from Jonquie`res automorphisms: they are our preferred choice due to their
ready invertibility though there are different kinds of automorphisms there.
We simultaneously use Jonquie`res automorphisms over all finite fields
Fp corresponding to every prime divisor p of the block size N , and then
patch them to yield a permutation on the block by appealing to Chinese
Remainder Theorem.
This encryption scheme makes available an immense collection of permu-
tations (i.e., a huge keyspace). To compare, while AES provides 2128 keys,
this method for a slightly smaller block size (but chosen conveniently), even
with an artificial restriction to smaller keys (“polynomials of degree ≤ 5”),
yields a keyspace of size bigger than 25478. Moreover, these permutation
calculations can be parallelized for speed.
Here are the salient features of this encryption scheme:
• As we map the message units with the points of affine spaces, one
layer of complexity at pre-encryption stage is eliminated providing
considerable simplification.
• Affine spaces as opposed to elliptic curves and abelian varieties are not
only conceptually simpler objects of algebraic geometry but also come
with a vast collection of automorphisms compared to them, thereby
affording a large keyspace meeting an important requirement of infor-
mation security.
• Block ciphers for blocks of size different from powers of a single prime
are provided.
• All the bijections and permutations used here are explicit, natural
mathematical constructions, and they are easily implementable as
computer programs. (We have implemented this algorithm for num-
bers of the form N = p4q4 as a Python program with 150 lines of
code).
• Computations are parallelizable: for any permutation provided by this
scheme, where any two different elements should be sent can be com-
puted without the knowledge of each other.
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Now we hasten to add that though theoretical description is available for
blocks whose size N has two or more distinct prime divisors, from the view-
point of utility value, only a certain restricted numbers N might be suitable.
We provide such a suitable number to compare the keyspace size with 128-bit
encryption.
For convenience and for avoiding notational clutter we describe our
scheme in the simpler case where block size N is of the form N = prqs,
with p, q distinct primes. Working out the general case of N having three
or more prime factors is straightforward.
This paper is organized as follows:
• In Section 1 we recall the definition of Jonquie`res automorphisms
which is a fundamental ingredient in our scheme. This focusses on
sets whose cardinality is a prime power.
• In the second section we provide the full description of our encryption
scheme which builds on top of Section 1 and uses Chinese Remainder
Theorem for weaving together the automorphisms coming from various
prime-power divisors of the block size.
• In Section 3 an alternative description is provided in an algorithmic
fashion to aid in computation.
• Finally in Section 4 we illustrate with an example that uses blocks of
a specific size slightly less than 2128 and compute the size of the key
space.
1 Jonquie`res Automorphisms
Consider the affine space An of dimension n, the set of n-tuples of elements
over some field F. We avoid calling it a vector space for the simple reason
that we will be doing non-linear operations on this set.
We use (x1, x2, . . . , xn) as co-ordinates of a point in this space. As an
affine algebraic variety An admits many automorphisms, besides the trans-
lations and linear automorphisms. Jonquie`res has defined a ‘triangular’
family of polynomial automorphisms ([J1864]). To define a Jonquie`res au-
tomorphism one has to first choose n− 1 polynomials P1, P2, . . . , Pn−1 with
coefficients in F such that P1 involves just one variable x1, P2 involves just
x1 and x2. In general the polynomial Pi is taken to be involving only the
first i variables x1, x2, . . . , xi. Along with this we also need non-zero scalars
from the base field, ai ∈ F
∗, for 1 ≤ 1 ≤ n.
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Lemma 1 (E. de Jonquie`res, 1864) Assume ai and the polynomials Pi
are as above. Further assume that for any of these Pi the degree is less
than p. Then the map J : An → An defined by sending (x1, x2, , . . . , xn) to
(y1, y2, . . . , yn) by the formula
y1 = a1x1
y2 = a2x2 + P1(x1)
y3 = a3x3 + P2(x1, x2)
...
...
...
yn = anxn + Pn−1(x1, x2, . . . , xn−1)
is an automorphism of the affine space as an affine algebraic variety.
Proof: The condition on the degree is to avoid terms of the form xpi
which bring inseparability issues. In all real world cryptographic applications
we need to choose p > 100, and degrees < 10.
To show that this is an automorphism one should exhibit an inverse
function and show that the inverse is also a polynomial function. Inverting
is not difficult, one simply imitates the procedure for solving a triangular
system of linear equations.
The inverse J−1 can be computed sequentially by the formulas below:
J−1(y1, y2, . . . , yn) = (x1, x2, . . . , xn) with
x1 = a
−1
1
y1
x2 = a
−1
2
(
y2 − P1(x1)
)
x3 = a
−1
3
(
y3 − P2(x1, x2)
)
...
xn = a
−1
n
(
yn − Pn−1(x1, x2, . . . , xn−1)
)
This proves the lemma and much more: the inverse of J is also a Jonquie`res
automorphism (see the first remark below).
Remark 1 The data consisting of scalars ai’s and polynomials Pi’s essen-
tially form the encryption key for our scheme. To justify the name symmetric
key encryption we can see that in the opposite direction the scalars bi’s are
simply the inverses of ai’s modulo p, and the polynomials in the opposite
directions are got by changing the signs of all the coefficients of Pi’s followed
by multiplication by bi’s. The upshot of this is that the decryption key is
readily obtained from the encryption key and they are mutual inverses as
required.
4
Remark 2 Other than the fact that these Pi’s should involve only the
variables x1 to xi (backward-mixing) there is no restriction on them in order
to define an automorphism. So one has a huge collection of Jonquie`res
automorphisms that can be readily written down. (see Lemma 3 below).
Remark 3 For practical considerations to enable good mixing one should
also introduce forward-mixing. For this purpose we take two such Jonquie`res
automorphisms, apply one of them first, follow it up with the reversal map,
(x1, x2, . . . , xn−1, xn) 7→ (xn, xn−1, . . . , x2, x1) and then apply the second
Jonquie`res automorphism. (Alternatively this can be understood as analo-
gous to carrying out an upper triangular transformation followed by a lower
triangular transformation).
Remark 4 Any function Fp → Fp is a polynomial function by La-
grange interpolation formula. Higher dimensional analogue of this is also
true. Any function from Anp to itself is a polynomial, actually a polyno-
mial of degree at most (p − 1)n. I thank user9072 of the internet forum
www.mathoverflow.com for pointing out the validity of this generalization.
Lemma 2 Let φ1 = (F1, F2, . . . , Fn) : A
n
p → A
n
p and φ2 = (G1, G2, . . . , Gn) :
Anp → A
n
p be two (polynomial) automorphisms. If total degree < p for every
Fi and Gj and if φ1, φ2 are different as polynomials (i.e., at least some pair
of corresponding coefficients are different) then φ1 6= φ2 as functions on A
n
p .
Proof: Suppose φ1 and φ2 are one and the same as functions. Then,
in particular, F1(x1, x2, . . . , xn) ≡ G1(x1, x2, . . . , xn). Specializing all the
xj , j ≥ 2 at 1, we get the following equality of univariate polynomial func-
tions over Fp: F1(x1, 1, 1, . . . , 1) = G1(x1, 1, 1, . . . , 1). This shows that the
difference between these polynomials in x1 is of degree at least p, as it has
all the elements of Fp as its roots. QED
Lemma 3 The number of ‘upper triangular’ Jonquie`res automorphisms
over a given prime field using low degree polynomials are as in the table
below:
Affine Space Degree Number of Automorphisms
A4p ≤ 3 p
34(p− 1)4
A4p ≤ 4 p
55(p− 1)4
A4p ≤ 5 p
83(p− 1)5
A5p ≤ 3 p
69(p− 1)5
A5p ≤ 4 p
125(p− 1)5
A5p ≤ 5 p
209(p− 1)5
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Proof : This follows from the well-known formula for the number of
monomials of degree d in n variables.
2 Construction of the Block Cipher
As stated in the introduction we take for simplicity N = prqs. Our object
is to produce explicitly a large family of constructible permutations of the
set of message units, M = {0, 1, 2, . . . , N − 1}.
Our idea can be summarised as below:
Step (i) to identify M with a geometric object, viz. a cartesian product of
affine spaces (over different prime fields) through explicit bijections.
Step (ii) apply Jonquie`res automorphisms independently in each of the
affine spaces forming the terms of the cartesian product above.
Step (iii) transport the product of Jonquie`res automorphisms back to the
message space M through the inverse of the bijections mentioned in
Step (i). It is simply retracing the bijections of Step (i).
2.1 Details of Step (i): Message Space to Affine Space
For this we regard M as the commutative ring of integers modulo N . Our
bijection of Step (i) is obtained as a composition of two bijections: first one
denoted by ψ, is a ring isomorphism, and the second one denoted by δ is a
set-theoretic bijection as indicated below:
M = Z/NZ
ψ
−→ Z/prZ× Z/qsZ
δ
−→ Arp ×A
s
q
Description of ψ,ψ−1: ψ is simply the calculation of the two remainders
of a number for division by pr and qs.
ψ(m) =
(
mmod pr, mmod qs
)
The inverse, ψ−1, is the map provided by Chinese Remainder Theorem.
Description of δ: First we define a function δp for a < p
r as a vector
formed by its digits in base p expansion:
δp(a) = (α0, α1, . . . , αr−1) for a =
r∑
j=0
αjp
j , 0 ≤ αj < p.
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Similarly δq(b) is defined using base q digits. Now δ is defined as
δ : Z/prZ× Z/qsZ −→ Arp ×A
s
q,
δ(a, b) =
(
δp(a), δq(b)
)
Inverse δ−1p is even easier to compute. Interpreting a vector with all
components integers less than p as the base-p digits, this will represent a
number less than pr. (Similarly for δ−1q ).
Example
Take N = 5000 = 2354. Let us first calculate ψ(471). As 471 (mod 23) = 7
and 471 (mod 54) = 96 we have ψ(471) = (7, 96).
Now δ
(
(7, 96)
)
=
(
(1, 1, 1), (0, 3, 4, 1)
)
(because 7 in binary is 111 and 96
in base 5 is 341. As 54|N , we have to write residues modulo 54 as 4-digit
numbers in base 5, inserting leading zeros where needed).
2.2 Details of Step (ii): Geometric Transformation within
the Affine Spaces
We take two pairs of Jonquie`res automorphisms (J1p , J
1
q ) and (J
2
p , J
2
q ) which
makes up our encryption key in this case. Each pair gives rise to a bijection
J = Jp × Jq : A
r
p ×A
s
q → A
r
p ×A
s
q, i.e., a cartesian product of Jonquie`res
automorphisms Jp : A
r
p → A
r
p , and Jq : A
s
q → A
s
q.
Key Selection To get a key one has to select finite sequences (of ap-
propriate length) of random integers in the ranges [0, p − 1] and [0, q − 1]
respectively to be used as coefficients of polynomials which make up the four
Jonquie`res automorphisms, J1p , J
2
p , J
1
q , J
2
q .
Let us assume such a selection has been made giving rise to a key K
consisting of two pairs of Jonquie`res automorphisms K : (J1p , J
1
q ), (J
2
p , J
2
q ).
Define reversal map as Arp ×A
s
q → A
r
p ×A
s
q by
(
α0, α1, . . . , αr−1; β0, β1, . . . , βs−1
) rev
−→
(
αr−1, αr−2, . . . , α0; βs−1, βs−2, . . . , β0
)
We apply the first pair (J1p , J
2
q ) to an element of the product A
r
p×A
s
q. Then
apply reversal and finally apply the second pair of Jonquie`res automorphisms
(J2p , J
2
q ). This completes Step (ii).
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2.3 Details of Step (iii): Back to Message Space from Affine
Space
In this stage we travel backwards to message space.
Arp ×A
s
q −→ Z/p
rZ× Z/qsZ −→ Z/NZ = M
Given an element in Arp take the components as base p digits and compute
the number < pr represented by it. Similarly do the same for the element
from Asq getting a number less than q
s.
The second leg of our return journey is δ−1. By Chinese remainder
theorem we get a unique number less than N = prqs using the two numbers
just obtained in the first leg of the journey taking us back to M.
2.4 The Full Picture
Now we get an encryption, i.e., a permutation EK of M = Z/NZ corre-
sponding to the choice of key K, through a sequence of compositions as
described by the commutative diagram shown in Figure 1.
Z/NZ
ψ
−→ Z/prZ× Z/qsZy δ
| Arp ×A
s
q
|
y J1p × J1q
| EK A
r
p ×A
s
q
|
y rev
| Arp ×A
s
q
|
y J2p × J2qy Arp ×Asqy δ−1
Z/NZ
ψ−1
←− Z/prZ× Z/qsZ
Figure 1: Schematic Description of the Encryption Algorithm
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3 Algorithm
Set-up: M = {0, 1, 2, . . . , N − 1}, with N = prqs
Encryption Key: Two ordered sets of polynomials {P1, P2, . . . , Pr−1},
and {Q1, Q2, . . . , Qs−1}, with the first set having coefficients in Fp, the sec-
ond set in Fq, with the ith polynomial in both sets involving only the first
i variables; and scalars ai ∈ F
∗
p, bj ∈ F
∗
q for 0 ≤ i ≤ r − 1, 0 ≤ j ≤ s − 1.
Denote this half of key datum by K, i,e,,
K = (P1, P2, . . . , Pr−1, a0, a1, . . . , ar−1, Q1, Q2, . . . , Qs−1, b0, b1, . . . , bs−1).
Similarly the other half of key datum is:
K ′ = (P ′1, P
′
2, . . . , P
′
r−1, a
′
0, a
′
1, . . . , a
′
r−1, Q
′
1, Q2,
′ . . . , Q′s−1, b
′
0, b
′
1, . . . , b
′
s−1).
Keyspace A single key for our encryption scheme, in the general case
where N = pr1
1
pr2
2
· · · prkk comprises two pairs of k-tuples of Jonquie`res :
(J1p1 , J
1
p2
, . . . , J1pk ; J
2
p1
, J2p2 , . . . , J
2
pk
) and (F 1p1 , F
1
p2
, . . . , F 1pk ;F
2
p1
, F 2p2 , . . . , F
2
pk
).
Algorithm: Given a number m ∈ M its encrypted value EK(m) for given
key K is computed by the steps below.
• Calculate the remainders mp,mq:
mp ≡ m (mod p
r); mq ≡ m (mod q
s)
• Extract the digits αi of mp and βj of mq in the bases p and q respec-
tively.
r−1∑
i=0
αip
i = mp;
s−1∑
j=0
βjq
j = mq; (αi < p, βj < q ∀i, j)
• Transform the alphas and betas by respective Jonquie`res automor-
phisms.
(α′0, α
′
1, . . . , α
′
r−1) =
(
a0α0, a1α1 + P1(α0), a2α2 + P2(α0, α1),
. . . , ar−1αr−1 + Pr−1(α0, α1, . . . , αr−2)
)
(β′0, β
′
1, . . . , β
′
s−1) =
(
b0β0, b1β1 +Q1(β0), b2β2 +Q2(β0, β1),
. . . , bs−1βs−1 +Qs−1(β0, β1, . . . , βs−2)
)
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• Reverse the components and apply the other pair of Jonquie`res auto-
morphisms.
(α′′0 , α
′′
1 , . . . , α
′′
r−1) =
(
a′0α
′
r−1, a
′
1α
′
r−2+P
′
1(α
′
r−1), a
′
2α
′
r−3+P
′
2(α
′
r−1, α
′
r−2),
. . . , a′r−1α
′
0 + P
′
r−1(αr−1, αr−2, . . . , α1)
)
(β′′0 , β
′′
1 , . . . , β
′′
s−1) =
(
b′0β
′
s−1, b
′
1β
′
s−2+P
′
1(β
′
s−1), b
′
2β
′
r−3+P
′
2(β
′
s−1, β
′
s−2),
. . . , b′s−1β
′
0 + P
′
s−1(βs−1, βs−2, . . . , β1)
)
• Assemble the individual digits α′′i ’s and β
′′
j ’s into numbersm
′
p(< p
r), m′q(<
qs), (r and s digit numbers in base p and q respectively):
m′p =
r−1∑
i=0
α′′i p
i; m′q =
s−1∑
j=0
β′′j q
j
• Compute by Chinese Remainder Theorem the unique number m′ < N
satisfying
m′ ≡ m′p (mod p
r); m′ ≡ m′q (mod q
s)
For this purpose one can, using Extended Euclidean Algorithm, pre-
compute (once) and store ep, eq satisfying
ep ≡ 1 (mod p
r), ep ≡ 0 (mod q
s); eq ≡ 1 (mod q
s), eq ≡ 0 (mod p
r)
Then compute m′ by
m′ = (m′pep +m
′
qeq) (mod N)
.
The m′ obtained in the last step is the encrypted value EK(m).
4 Comparison with AES-128
Computations were done with SAGE Version 6.10. The block size of AES
is:
2128 = 340282366920938463463374607431768211456
We searched for a number that had every prime dividing at least to the 5th
power and close to 2128. By trial and error we arrived at
p1 = 163; p2 = 509; p3 = 603; N = p
5
1p
5
2p
5
3
10
N = 340274423051874795558305386758572502851
(This has the same number of decimal digits as 2128 with the most significant
four digits coinciding with it).
To get a lower bound for the number of keys one can compute the num-
ber of polynomials P1, P2, P3, P4 of degree at most 5, with Pi involving i
variables, and the number of choices for 5-tuples of non-zero scalars. By
Lemma 2, for degrees less than the finite field order, the automorphisms
would be distinct, and the table in Lemma 3 says the lower bound is
(603 × 509× 163)209 × (602 × 508× 162)5.
This works out to be of the order of 25478 or 101649. This is much larger
than the keyspace of size 2128 from AES-128, despites a smaller block size!
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